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1 Introduction
In the autumn 2001 politicians agreed upon allowing a tradable quota system to
deal with the country specific stated goals in the Kyoto protocol to reduce the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases in a cost eﬃcient way, Marracesh (2001)1. The market
for permits sets a price on emissions of greenhouse gases, increases the cost of pro-
ducing energy from fossil fuels and thereby improves the profitability of producing
from renewable energy sources. Pricing emissions implies substitution from highly
polluting technologies to less polluting technologies. There are some well-founded
scepticism about the time frame, the pace and the possibility to have an eﬀective
introduction of such a permit market. Besides, since US hardly ratify the Kyoto
protocol, a permit market solution probably realize close to zero prices in the short
run, see Bøhringer (2002) and IEAWorld Energy Outlook 2000. Emission reduction
potential is then low. Politicians then advocate additional instruments to speed
up the conversion to non-fossil fuels or renewable energy to combat greenhouse
gas emissions. They propose instruments that directly or indirectly stimulates and
foster the expansion of renewable or so called green energy. In this paper we refer
to green technologies synonymous with renewable energy2.
There are several incentive problems with traditional instruments like price and
investment support for renewable energy. Stimulating the cost minimizing green
energy sources through subsidies requires information about the cost of all possible
renewable energy technologies. Lack of information complicates cost minimization,
increases the possibility of cost over coverage, and lack of eﬃciency. A political
anomaly may also occur since lowering the cost of renewable energy lowers pur-
chaser prices of energy, which implies a subsidy of energy and increased energy
consumption. An obvious advantage of supporting renewable energy is the cre-
ation of possible positive externalities from research on new technologies through
learning by doing, see for instance Spence (1984), Hall and Howell (1985), Joskow
and Rose (1985), Romer (1986) and Schrattenholzer (2002).
A new alternative supporting instrument for renewable energy coming up in
the literature, and frequently discussed among politicians, is the so called green
certificate system. A green certificate is a proof of the green origin of an amount
1See the second addendum, The Marracesh Accords
2Defining the green technology is not simple, however this is not the subject in this article.
For a closer discussion see Voogt et al (2000)
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of energy produced. Diﬀerent kinds of renewable energy sources are classified as
green, see COMM(2000), Hoogland et al. (2000), Poupolo et al. (2000), Voogt et
al. (2000), Voogt et al. (2001), Amundsen et al. (2001) and Jensen et al. (2002).
For each unit of energy produced by renewable energy the government issues a green
certificate to the producer. The consumer has to purchase a number of certificates,
which is proportional to his total amount of energy. This creates a market for
the green energy certificates. The green producers harvest an additional certificate
price in the certificate market, which increase the profitability of producing energy
from green technologies. An advantage of this green certificate instrument over
a simple price and standard investment subsidy instrument is that the certificate
market will contribute to a cost eﬃcient solution in the energy market under the
green energy production share constraint. The green commitment share and the
definition of green technologies is a governmental issue.
Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) study the relationship between a green cer-
tificate market and a market for CO2 permits, under the constraint of upper and
lower price bounds on the green certificates. They particularly show that under
certain circumstances harsher CO2 constraints may lead to less capacity of green
electricity, which at first sight may seem contra intuitive. Jensen and Skytte (2002)
show that under certain premises the purchaser price eﬀect in the electricity market
may be ambiguous when introducing green certificates.
In this article we show that the results shown in Amundsen et al. (2001) and
Jensen et al (2002) are more complex as the eﬀect on prices of volumes changes
sign as the government increases the imposed share of green certificates. We estab-
lish a model that includes two diﬀerent energy technologies, that are referred to as
traditional environmentally damaging technology and a green technology (environ-
mentally friendly and renewable). Both compete in the same market. The green
technology is not profitable in an ordinary market. However, a green certificate in-
strument is introduced as described to help the penetration of green technologies.
We formally derive what happens to energy prices, purchaser prices, certificate
prices and energy demand by source as the government increases the committed
green energy share. The theoretical model produces ambiguous price and volume
eﬀects under a wide range of assumptions about the committed green shares, elas-
ticities, etc. The sign of the price and volume eﬀect also changes as the share
increases. We show that the purchaser obligation introduces a ”tax” eﬀect in the
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traditional energy market (demand tax) and a ”subsidy” eﬀect in the green energy
market (producer subsidy).We also perform numerical simulations of the model
under increasing impositions of the green technology market share, under diﬀerent
assumption on elasticities etc. Provided increasing marginal cost of expansion for
both traditional and green technologies (elasticities are varied), we show that the
purchaser price eﬀect is negative and the volume eﬀect is positive when increas-
ing the imposed green share, even if the production cost of green energy is very
high. Increasing marginal cost in the traditional energy supply sector and equi-
librium eﬀects imply that the producer of traditional energy pays more than the
incremental total cost for the green technology and thereby allows consumer sur-
plus to increase. For strict environmental conditions, i.e. large quantities of green
technology commitments, the price and volume eﬀects changes sign.
This applies for electricity or energy markets in one isolated country (autarky).
Deregulation of international electricity markets implies price taker behavior as
long as transmission capacity is idle. Under these conditions an increasing com-
mitment of domestic green energy shares does not influence equilibrium energy
prices, and conventional results prevail, i.e. purchaser prices increase as the com-
mitment increase. Most European countries want to introduce green certificate
markets. Deregulation makes Europe one single energy market (except when trans-
mission capacity constraints are eﬀective). In this market producers face increasing
marginal costs of expanding energy production capacity. Again, increased green
commitment shares reduce traditional energy production, which will reduce both
producer and purchaser prices of energy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows; In chapter 2 we establish a formal
market model under autarky and derive the theoretical results for what will happen
to prices and demand as the government increases the committed amount of cer-
tificates. We assume perfect competition in both the ordinary and the renewable
energy market, however restricted by the imposed green certificate rule. We also
discuss modifications of the results when opening the market for trade of energy.
In chapter 3 we calibrate and simulate a numerical version of the model and com-
pare the theoretical results derived in chapter 2.Chapter 4 concludes. Theoretical
derivation and numerical model presentation is presented in the Appendix A and
Appendix B.
5
2 An autarky market model including green cer-
tificates
We define a market for two kinds of energy: green energy and traditional energy.
Green energy is based on renewable energy sources and thereby environmentally
friendly3. Traditional energy is environmental damaging of some kind, such as for
instance pollution from coal fired electricity producing plants.
For simplicity we assume one consumer and one producer of energy4. The
producer generates secondary energy (for instance electricity) based on a primary
energy source (water, oil, coal etc) and a technology either classified as traditional
or green. The producer may choose one or a mix of technologies. The maximization
problem for the producer is
maxπ(xg, xv) = pxv + pgxg − C(xv, xg) (1)
subject to a positive constraint on the output, xi ≥ 0,of energy produced with
technology i = g, v (g=green, v=traditional). Here π is profit from the mixed
production, p is the seller price of ordinary energy, pg is the seller price for green
energy, and C(xv, xg) is the mixed technology cost function for the producer. Also
for the consumer both types of energy are perfect substitutes and green production
is therefore excluded if pg > p. Since C v < C

g no production of green energy takes
place.
The first condition necessary to establish a market for the green energy is that
the government issues a green certificate for each unit of green energy produced.
The producer then sells the homogenous energy product to the market clearing
price p. In addition they want to sell green certificates at a price that secures
p+ pc = C

g , pc being the certificate price. Equation (1) then may be written as
maxπ(xg, xv) = pxv + (p+ pc)xg − C(xv, xg) (2)
We assume that the cost function is additively separable with respect to xv and
xg as the two technologies are distinct and implies diﬀerent investments. We also
assume increasing long term marginal cost in both technologies
3Defining the green technology is not simple, and this is not the subject in this article. For
further discussion of this subject see for instance Voogt et al. (2000).
4This simplification do not matter for the results.
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∂C
∂xv
> 0 and
∂C
∂xg
> 0 . (3)
The supply of energy xS now is
xS = g(p) + h(pg) = g(p) + h(p+ pc) (4)
where g(p) is the supply of ordinary energy and h(p + pc) is the supply of green
energy.
The consumer normally maximize utility5 U(xD) of energy demand xD net of
purchaser cost pxD
maxU(xD)− pxD. (5)
The second necessary condition to establish a market for green energy is to make
sure that consumers actually purchase the green certificates. The government then
imposes on the consumer to purchase an amount α of certificates xc proportional
to the amount of his energy demand xD
xc = αxD . (6)
The purchaser price for energy (including certificates), px, may then be formulated
as a weighted sum of the energy and the certificate price
px =
pxD + pcx
c
xD
= p+ αpc . (7)
Inserting (7) into (5) yields energy demand as a function of the energy price, the
certificate price and the imposed share of green consumption
xD = f(p+ αpc) .
By assumption then the price of the certificate and the price of energy is high
enough to make it profitable to produce energy from green technologies
pg = p+ pc = C

g . (8)
In equilibrium a (1 − α) share of demand equals the supply of traditional energy
and an α share of demand equals the supply of green energy
5We assume continuity and divisibility.
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(1− α)f(p+ αpc) = g(p) , (9)
αf(p+ αpc) = h(p+ pc) (10)
which determines p and pcas a function of the exogenous α. An alternative speci-
fication of (10) is
αf(pg − (1− α)pc) = h(pg) (11)
Equation (9) and (11) shows that the green certificate system turns out to be a
combination of a tax on energy by an endogenous energy tax rate of αpc and a
subsidy of the green energy by an endogenous subsidy rate of (1 − α)pc, i.e. two
traditional instruments turned into one.
In most discussions about the introduction of green certificates, see for example
Hoogland et al. (2000), Poupolo et al. (2000), and Voogt et al. (2001) a step-
wise introduction of the green technologies is proposed. What happens to the
equilibrium prices and volumes as the green share α increases, that is, as the
government increases the environmental imposition of the amount of green energy,
i.e. increases α?
Proposition 1. The energy price p will go down as the imposed α
share increases, i.e. ∂p∂α < 0
Proof: We find the first order derivative of both relations in the equilibrium
conditions (9) and (10) with respect to α, which gives us two equations
[(1− α)f  − g] ∂p
∂α
+ (1− α)αf ∂pc
∂α
= f − (1− α)f pc. (12)
(αf  − h) ∂p
∂α
+ (α2f  − h)∂pc
∂α
= −f − αf pc. (13)
where the arguments are omitted in the functions f(p+ αpc) etc, see appendix A.
The solution for ∂p∂αbecomes (see appendix A for a formal derivation)
∂p
∂α
=
−f (αf + (1− α)hpc) + hf
f ((1− α)2h + α2g)− hg < 0 (14)
i.e. less than zero since the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative6.
The producer price in the ordinary energy market decreases as the government
6Recall that the first order derivative of the demand function f 3 < 0 and the first order
derivative of both supply functions g3 > 0 and h3 > 0.
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imposes a higher green energy α share. The introduction of green certificates
becomes a strain on the traditional energy market, and the traditional energy
producers lose profit.
Figure (1) describes the market for traditional energy. The market equilibrium
before the introduction of the certificate market is (p0, x0). The green certificate
purchaser requirement shifts the demand curve inwards in two steps; First from f(p)
to f(p + αpc). This first step is related to the increased eﬀective purchaser price,
which is equivalent to the eﬀect of introducing a tax on energy (αpc). This would
create a new equilibrium in (p1, x1) where the purchaser price equals (p1 + αpc).
Figure 1: Certificate commitment and eﬀects in the ordinary market.
f(p)
Tax
Share
x0x*
p0
p*
g(p)
f(p+ α pc)
(1- α) f(p+ α pc)
pw
p1+ α pc
p1
x1
However, only a fraction (1 − α) of total demand may be satisfied by tradi-
tional energy. In the second step the demand curve twists downwards to the left,
(1 − α)f(p + αpc). The new equilibrium price and volume is (p∗, x∗). Depending
upon the shift and the twist of the demand curve, the imposed α share have im-
pact on both the price and volume. The diﬀerence between the energy price and
the willingness to pay, (pw − p∗), where pw = U x∗,may be large. Then ∂p∂α < 0
since the introduction of green energy will displace traditional energy that faces an
upward sloping supply curve. The eﬀect comes both through an implicit taxing of
traditional energy and a sharing restriction in the market.
Proposition 2. The certificate price pc will increase, i.e. ∂pc∂α > 0, as the
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imposed α share increases and if h

g >
α
1−α or else the sign is undefined
Proof: The nominator in
∂Pc
∂α
=
ff  − f(h + g) + f pc((1− α)h − αg)
f ((1− α)2h + α2g)− hg (15)
is at first sight apparently undetermined. The first term is negative since f > 0
and f  < 0, so is the second term as both h > 0 and g > 0. The last term
is negative if (1 − α)h > αg , i.e. if h
g >
α
1−α , that is if the relation between
the derivative of supply of green energy to the derivative of the supply of normal
energy is higher than the relation between the green and the traditional energy
shares h

g >
α
1−α . If the derivatives are equal negativity happens when the green
share is less than the traditional energy share, i.e. if the green share α is less
than 50 per cent. However, this is not a necessary condition for negativity. The
nominator .|f pc((1 − α)h − αg)| < |ff  − f(h + g)|. Intuitively the certificate
price increases as the mandatory green share increases. The increasing marginal
cost curve in (??),however, is not suﬃcient for concluding that ∂0Pc/∂α > 0 as the
share α could increase by a reduction in the volume of traditional energy ( h(p)).
Proposition 3. The purchaser price of energy including certificates px
could both increase and decrease as the imposed α share increases, i.e.
0 ≥ ∂px∂α ≥ 0. The sign is ambiguous.
Proof: The purchaser price (10) is a weighted average of the change in the
producer price, the change in the certificate price and the absolute value of the
certificate price.
∂px
∂α
=
∂p
∂α
+ α
∂pc
∂α
+ pc (16)
The first increases, see proposition 1, and the second may decrease, see proposition
2. Manipulating (16), (14), and (15)
∂px
∂α
=
1
|A|

 (1− α)fh
 − αfg − (1− α)2f hpc−
α2f gpc + (1− α)2f hpc + α2f gpc − pchg
,

 (17)
where |A| < 0, is the determinant of the equation set (12) and (13). This reduces
to
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∂px
∂α
=
1
|A| {f
((1− α)h − αg)− hgpc} (18)
The last term in the nominator (−hgpc) is negative since both supply’s deriv-
ative and the equilibrium price of certificates have to be positive. If the rela-
tion between the supply derivative for green and ordinary energy, h

g >
α
1−α , then
f ((1 − α)h − αg) < 0 and ∂px∂α > 0. The purchaser price increases as the green
share increases. When the supply derivative of green energy is zero purchaser prices
always increase.
When the supply derivative of green technology is infinitely large (cfr. a back-
stop technology) then this term is positive if f(1−α) > gpc, and purchaser prices
decrease as the green share increases. When the derivatives for both supply’s are
equal f((1−α)h−αg) > 0 for shares of α less than 0.5, then ∂px∂α < 0 might be the
outcome if f((1 − α)h − αg) > hgpc. Purchaser prices may well decrease as the
α share increases. As the α share increases even more, the sign typically changes,
i.e. ∂px∂α > 0. If the derivatives are at equal sizes then small shares increases the
possibility that f((1− α)h − αg) > hgPc, i.e. that purchaser prices decrease as
the α share increases.
Figure (2) illustrates what happens. The supply of green energy h(p) is too
costly to penetrate the market at an initial price of p0. However, the supply of
green technologies shifts to the right h(p + pc) as the certificate price works as a
subsidy in the market. The aggregate supply is g(p) + h(p + pc). The equilibrium
point is the crossing of the total ”taxed” demand f(p+αpc) and the total aggregate
supply, i.e. (p∗, x∗∗).
We notice that p∗ < p0 . As discussed above, whether the purchaser price is
higher or lower than the former equilibrium price, p0, is depending upon the α
share, the elasticity of supply for traditional energy (moving down the marginal
cost curve) and the elasticity of supply for green energy .
3 International trade
So far we have discussed possible price and volume eﬀects of green certificate intro-
duction under autarky. In Northern Europe, however, the electricity markets are
11
Figure 2: Green and traditional energy
f(p)
x*
p*
g(p)
f(p+ α pc)
(1- α) f(p+ α pc)
h(p)
h(p+pc)
g(p) + h(p+pc)
x**
p0
deregulated and trade is fluent. Most of the domestic actors are small and thereby
price takers in a larger international market. Then equation (14) reduces to
∂p
α
= 0, (19)
since the domestic green production anyway will be to small to influence European
market prices. In this case, cfr.(15) we found that ∂pc/∂α > 0. Therefore according
to (16) ,
∂px
α
> 0. (20)
Purchaser prices increase and domestic demand decreases.
3.1 Imports
In an import situation, supply (foreign supply) is infinitely elastic around the equi-
librium point as long as the transmission capacity is not exceeded, see A − B in
figure (3). The supply curve, T , left of point A is domestic supply. Domestic supply
also forms the increasing part of the supply curve to the right of point B.
The domestic demand is downward sloping (E), and the equilibrium with im-
ports and idle transmission capacity is in (p1, x1). The import is (x1 − A). A
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Figure 3: Import of energy and the eﬀect of green certificates
p, b
x
E
T
x1
p1
x2
p2
A B
domestic purchaser green certificate requirement (”tax”) shifts domestic demand
downwards (to the left). A certificate to the domestic producer (”subsidy”) shifts
domestic supply outwards (to the right) (cf. the dotted demand and supply curves
in figure (3)). We notice that a shift in the supply curve and a shift in the domestic
demand do not change the energy price, p1, as long as transmission capacity limits
are not exceeded (the flat part - or the infinite elastic part - of the supply curve).
The domestic purchaser price (20) increases, p2, and domestic demand decreases,
x2. Increased domestic supply and reduced domestic demand both contribute to
reduced imports (in figure (3) to zero). Under import conditions a domestic green
certificate market causes a downward shift in transmission losses as imports are
reduced. The profitability of the transmission network is reduced as capacity uti-
lization decreases.
3.2 Exports
Let us reverse trade, i.e. the relevant country is net exporting at fixed prices,
see figure (4). Domestic demand is the left of A downward sloping solid curve
and exports are the infinitely elastic part of demand (between A and B) as long
as transmission capacity is suﬃcient. The right of B downward sloping part of
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Figure 4: Export of energy and the eﬀect of green certificates
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demand is the residual domestic demand when transmission capacity is exceeded.
Supply is a normal upward continuous sloping curve, since exporting implies just
domestic supply in this market. Demand is infinitely elastic around equilibrium
(p1, x1). Domestic demand is A, export is (x1 −A), while transmission capacity is
B − A. A purchaser green certificate requirement (”tax”) shift domestic demand
downwards (to the left). A domestic certificate on green production (”subsidy”)
shift domestic supply outwards (to the right). cf. the dotted demand and supply
curves. We notice that this shift in both the domestic supply and demand curve
do not change the energy price, p1, as long as transmission capacity limits are not
exceeded (B − x2) ≤ (B − A). The domestic purchaser price (20) increases to
p2, and domestic demand decreases to x2. Increased domestic supply and reduced
domestic demand both contribute to increased exports by (A− x1) + (B− x1). In
an export situation then, a domestic green certificate market cause an upward shift
in both power losses and the profitability of the transmission network as capacity
utilization increases.
3.3 Transmission capacity limits
For both an import and export situation, when capacity limits on the transmission
network is reached, i.e. (import ≥ B − A ≤ export), the model reduces to pro-
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duce autarky results. Even though Europe is a common competitive market, with
each country behaving as price takers, transmission capacity restrictions between
countries reduces the market. The above theory with ambiguous results for prices
and volumes may then be relevant, if not for every period of time, at least in the
periods where transmission capacity is restricted.
3.4 One international energy and certificate market
Several countries in the EU are discussing common rules for domestic green certifi-
cates and the European Commission advocates this. When adding all European
production capacities it is reasonable to assume increasing marginal cost for pro-
ducing energy in the total market, i.e. an upward sloping supply curve both for
traditional energy and renewable energy. On the demand side we face the common
downward sloping curve. This makes the model produce autarky results for the
whole European market and the contra intuitive results of decreasing purchaser
prices, when the imposition of green certificate share increases, prevails.
4 Some empirical evidence
The North European power market is presently characterized by excess producer
capacity and low market prices. It is expected that the market will tighten in a few
years and capacity expansion will occur. The Norwegian power market is almost
totally based on hydropower. On the margin, new hydropower capacity expansion
is still in question in a limited amount. But as the market tightens and prices
increase, natural gas power technology is the most probable backstop technology,
disregarding environmental problems. As a potential number of natural gas power
plants are actualized, and Norwegian greenhouse gas objectives endure, emission
permit prices will increase and so will cost of gas power production. Therefore, even
in a hydro-based power market, as for instance the Norwegian market, politicians
discuss a green certificate market to stimulate green technologies to keep emissions
from thermal power plants out of the market. Introduction of green certificates to
obtain this is hardly eﬃcient compared to application of other instruments, but
this is not the subject of this article.
The Norwegian production capacity of hydropower, when precipitation and
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inflow is normal, is approximately 118 TWh a year (2001). Actual production in
2001 was 122 TWh due to heavy rainfall and abnormal precipitation. Based on
detailed information about possible hydropower plant projects (see NWE 2000)
and cost estimates for natural gas power plants we establish a long term marginal
cost curve and estimate the supply elasticity in this market, see T1 in figure (5). In
our model this is calculated to 0.3 in a Cobb Douglas specification of the supply
function, see Appendix 1. We calibrate the supply model to a normal precipitation
year.
Demand of electricity in 2001 was somewhat higher than supply due to a cold
year. Johnsen (2000) estimated the overall elasticity of demand for electricity in
the Norwegian market to 0.1, see D in figure (5). Based on a macro economic
model for the Norwegian economy, Bye et al. (1998) estimated an annual growth
of demand by slightly more than 1 TWh a year taking into account that prices
would increase from 15 to 20 øre/kWh7 in a five years future. In the domestic
market the equilibrium price at a future volume of 132 TWh then is estimated to
approximately 20 øre/kWh, which equalizes approximately the total unit cost of a
natural gas power plant when a greenhouse gas permit price is exempted.
The NorwegianWater and Energy Authority (NWE 2000) states that the cheap-
est green renewable technology for producing electricity in the Norwegian market
is approximately 25 øre/kWh, remembering that large hydro power plants are not
allowed under the green technology definition in most countries’ green certificate
plan, see Voogt et al. (2000). At this price per kWh the green technologies are too
expensive to penetrate the market without any support. Although NWE (2000)
operates with discrete projects we smooth the supply curve to fit with an elasticity
of substitution of 0.3 and an intercept of 25 øre/kWh, see the left supply curve
T2 in figure (5).
Equilibrium in this market before the introduction of green certificates is then
characterized by a purchaser price of 20 øre/kWh and a volume of 132 TWh, in
our illustration year 2010 - i.e. the mid period of the targeted years in the Kyoto
protocol, see point A in figure(5).
We introduce a consumer commitment of purchasing green certificates issued
to green producers in this market and convey a model simulation of the new equi-
librium when the green share (α) is set to 10 per cent. The new equilibrium seller’s
720 øre/kWh equals approximately 3 US cent/kWh.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium with and without a green share
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price for energy is reduced by 25 per cent to 14,9 øre/kWh and the volume of tra-
ditional energy is reduced by 8,5 per cent to 120,8 TWh, see point C in Figure.(5)
The marginal cost of the green technology in the equilibrium point is 34,6 øre/kWh
(see point F in Figure (5)), i.e. the certificate price is 10 per cent of the diﬀer-
ence (34,5-14,9)*0.1=1.9. The total purchaser price, including the green certificate
price, is 16,8 øre/kWh a reduction by 16 per cent and the total energy production
is of 134,3 TWh, an increase by close to 2 per cent, see point B in Figure (5).
The purchaser price in the new equilibrium then is substantially lower than
the equilibrium price in the calculation without the certificate commitment. The
volume is consequently higher. Introducing a green certificate in this market, i.e.
a ”tax” on dirty producers and a ”subsidy” to green producers, imply a transfer
of producer surplus in the ordinary energy market to both a producer surplus for
the green production and a consumer surplus. In this simulation the traditional
producers bear the whole burden of the regulation while consumers harvest a net
gain.
Before we introduce the green certificates producer surplus is measured as the
triangle between the price line p0, the equilibrium point (x0, p0)and the supply
17
Figure 6: Consumer and producer surplus
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function g(p) in figure (6). Consumer surplus is measured by the area between
the price line p0, the equilibrium point and the demand function f(p). When
introducing green certificate requirements the producer surplus in the ordinary
energy market PST drops by
∆PST = p0x0 − p∗x∗ −
] p0
p∗
g(p)∂p (21)
as the volume of traditional energy and the price of energy decreases. Consumer
surplus CS increases by
∆CS =
] p∗+αpc
p0
f(p)∂p− p0(x∗∗ − x0) + [p0 − (p∗ + αpc)] x0. (22)
The production of green energy is
xg = x
∗∗ − x∗ (23)
and producer surplus in the green production is the diﬀerence between total pro-
ducer surplus and the surplus in traditional production
PSG = p
∗x∗∗ −
] p∗
0
[g(p) + h(p + pc)] ∂p−
] p∗
0
g(p)∂p.
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Figure 7: Prices as a function of increasing green shares
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At a green share of 10 per cent the loss for ordinary producers is 5.9 billion
Norwegian kroner (0.4 billion US$). The consumer surplus increases by 4.3 billion
Norwegian kroner, as total volume increases and purchaser price drops. The green
producers receives their profit from their production and the α share of the certifi-
cate price for the total energy volume. The producer surplus in the green energy
reaches 0.6 billion Norwegian kroner. Thus, total welfare, defined as the producer
and consumer surplus in the two markets, decreases by 1 billion Norwegian kro-
ner a year. The environmental benefit should exceed this sum to make the policy
decision of introducing green certificates welfare optimal.8
So far we have shown that the possible theoretical outcome with decreasing
purchaser price and increasing volumes actually happens in this market when the
green share obligation is set to 10 per cent. What happens when we vary the green
share obligation?
In Figure (7) we have simulated the model for a whole range of green share
obligations from zero to 60 per cent. As we increase the required amount of green
energy, the price of ordinary energy drops and the price of green energy increases,
both as expected. The purchaser price, i.e. the aggregate price of energy and
8Presumes that no other more cost eﬃcient instrument is feasible.
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Figure 8: Optimal production as a function of the green share
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the certificate starts dropping and reaches a minimum at a commitment share of
approximately 15 per cent. Then it starts rising and passes the initial equilibrium
level at a share of 24 per cent and increases sharply as the relative importance of
the costly green technology increases.
Figure (8) shows the consistent volume part that mirrors the price movements.
Even though the ordinary supply drops all the way, total supply increases up to the
minimum price level, then starts dropping fast, turn the earlier equilibrium level
and continue to drop, although slower.
This certainly shows that when policy makers wish to speed up the introduction
of green technologies by introducing green certificates the outcome may well be in
conflict with other goals on limiting total energy use. The only way to obtain both
goals may be to increase the required green energy share substantially.
The discussion of the total price eﬀect in (7) showed that the relative elasticities
(or the derivatives) of supply, h/g,could be important for the findings. In table 1
we illustrate some alternative combinations of the relative supply elasticities and
the demand elasticity.
Figure (9) shows that our results holds is general; In all alternatives the pur-
chaser price decreases when the imposed green share increases up to a certain level.
However, when the relative supply elasticity h/g (the green supply elasticity over
the traditional supply elasticity) decreases purchaser prices hardly decrease when
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Figure 9: Purchaser price eﬀect under diﬀerent elasticities
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the certificate share rise (PX − 06− 02− 01). On the opposite, when the relative
supply elasticity, h/g increases the purchaser prices decrease substantially when
the green share rises (PX − 01 − 09 − 01). A high elasticity of demand diminish
the tendency to lower purchaser prices as the green share rises.
Table 1: Alternative combinations of elasticities
Alternatives Supply elasticity Demand elasticity
Traditional Green
PX − 03− 03− 01 0.3 0.3 −0.1
PX − 06− 02− 01 0.6 0.2 −0.1
PX − 01− 09− 01 0.1 0.9 −0.1
PX − 03− 03− 03 0.3 0.3 −0.3
Even if the elasticities of supply and demand are important for the simulations
they do not seem to interfere with the general conclusion that in a perfect compet-
itive market existing producers of energy have to endure a producer surplus loss
if government wants to introduce a green certificate instrument into the market to
foster renewable technologies. The consumers could enjoy this enforcement since
their surplus increases with lowered prices and increased volumes.
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5 Conclusions
Several governments in Europe point to green certificates as important instruments
to solve greenhouse gas issues, help green immature technologies to enter the mar-
ket, and reduce energy use etc. In this article we establish a market model for
energy both produced by ordinary and green technologies, in which the profitabil-
ity of the green technology is raised through a green certificate and a purchaser
commitment instrument. Both the theoretical and applied calibrated model pro-
duce ambiguous results for the equilibrium purchaser prices and volumes of energy.
The mechanism could be compared to the eﬀects of a tax on ordinary energy de-
mand combined with a subsidy on green energy supply. However, by the green
certificate set up these two instruments are reduced to one, acting together with
the governments decision concerning the share of green energy wanted in the mar-
ket. The numerical model simulations indicates that the ambiguous results apply
for small to even large shares of green energy commitments. When the green share
increases above 25 per cent normal results, i.e. increasing prices and reduced vol-
ume, are obtained. These results may prevail both under autarky and free trade.
Under free trade, the transmission capacity are exceeded now and then, and au-
tarky results persist. Even under no restriction on transmission capacity ambiguity
may arise. Since several European countries want to introduce green certificates,
the total European supply is an increasing function of prices, which is a necessary
condition for ambiguity in the model.
Even if the elasticities of supply and demand are important when discussing
the theoretical results they do not seem to interfere with the general conclusion
that in a perfect competitive market existing producers of energy have to endure a
producer surplus loss if the government introduces a green certificate instrument to
foster renewable technologies. The consumers benefit from this enforcement since
their surplus increases with lowered prices and increased volumes.
The literature provides arguments in favour of support of immature renew-
able technologies because of a possible learning by doing eﬀect that may raise the
profitability of such technologies. However, it is not obvious how the certificate
market will work as an appropriate supporting instrument in this respect, see Bye,
Rosendahl and Greaker (2002).
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6 Appendix A: A formal derivation of price ef-
fects
The first order derivative of equation (9)
−f + (1− α)f  ·
#
∂p
∂α
+ α
∂pc
∂α
+ pc
$
= g ·
#
∂p
∂α
$
, (24)
having introduced
g =
∂g
∂(p)
> 0 . (25)
A reformulation of (24) implies
[(1− α)f  − g] ∂p
∂α
+ (1− α)αf ∂pc
∂α
= f − (1− α)f pc. (26)
The first order derivative of (10) is
f + f  · α
#
∂p
∂α
+ α
∂pc
∂α
+ pc
$
= h ·
#
∂p
∂α
+
∂pc
∂α
$
, (27)
having introduced
f = f(p + αpc), (28)
f  =
∂f
∂(p+ αpc)
< 0 , (29)
h =
∂h
∂(p+ pc)
> 0 . (30)
A reformulation of (27) implies
(αf  − h) ∂p
∂α
+ (α2f  − h)∂pc
∂α
= −f − αf pc. (31)
We apply Cramer’s rule to solve for ∂P∂α ,
∂Pc
∂α , and
∂Px
∂α . Equation (31) and (26)
reduces to
a11
∂p
∂α
+ a12
∂pc
∂α
= b1 , (32)
a21
∂p
∂α
+ a22
∂pc
∂α
= b2 .
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when we introduce the following relationships
a11 = αf  − h ,
a12 = α2f  − h ,
a21 = (1− α)f  − g , (33)
a22 = α(1− α)f  ,
b1 = −f − αf pc ,
b2 = f − (1− α)f pc .
Then the determinant
|A| = a11a22 − a12a21
= (αf  − h)α(1− α)f  − (α2f  − h)((1− α)f  − g)
= α2(1− α)f 2 − α(1− α)f h − α2(1− α)f 2
+α2f g + h(1− α)f  − hg (34)
= (1− α)2f h + α2f g − hg
|A| < 0
is negative as all the terms are negative (remember that h and g are both positive
(30 and 25) and f  is negative (29). The first cofactor
|A1| =

b1 a12
b2 a22

= (−f − αf pc)α(1− α)f  − (α2f  − h)(f − (1− α)f pc) (35)
= −α(1− α)ff  − α2(1− α)f 2Pc − α2ff  +
hf + α2(1− α)f 2pc − (1− α)f pch
= −αff  + hf − (1− α)f hpc > 0 (36)
is positive as all the terms are positive. Then
∂p
∂α
=
A1
|A| =
−f (αf + (1− α)hpc) + hf
f ((1− α)2h + α2g)− hg < 0 (37)
The second cofactor is
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|A2| =

a11 b1
a21 b2

= (αf  − h)(f − (1− α)f pc)− (−f − αf pc)((1− α)f  − g) (38)
= αf f − fh − α(1− α)f 2pc + (1− α)f hpc
+(1− α)ff  − fg + α(1− α)f 2pc − αf gpc
= ff  − f(h + g) + f pc((1− α)h − αg)
Then
∂Pc
∂α
=
A2
|A| =
ff  − f(h + g) + f pc((1− α)h − αg)
f ((1− α)2h + α2g)− hg > 0 (39)
The purchaser price is a weighted average of the change in the producer price,
the change in the certificate price and the absolute value of the certificate price.
∂px
∂α
=
∂p
∂α
+ α
∂pc
∂α
+ pc (40)
Manipulating gives
∂px
∂α
=
1
|A|

 (1− α)fh
 − αfg − (1− α)2f hpc−
α2f gpc + (1− α)2f hpc + α2f gpc − pchg
,

 (41)
which reduces to
∂px
∂α
=
1
|A| {f((1− α)h
 − αg)− hgpc} (42)
7 Appendix B: The calibrated model applied in
the paper
A Cobb Douglas specification of the demand function f
XD = AD(p+ αpc)ε (43)
where AD is the calibration and ε is the elasticity of demand. The supply function
h for traditional energy
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Xv = Av(p)κv (44)
where Av is the calibration factor and κv is the supply elasticity. The supply g for
green energy
Xg = Ag(pg)
κg − ξg (45)
where Ag is the calibration factor and κg is the supply elasticity, ξg representing
the intercept (for this energy carrier). This could alternatively be formulated as
Xg = Ag(p+ pc)
κg − ξg (46)
Total supply now is
XT = Xv +Xg = Av(p)κv +Ag(p+ pc)
κg − ξg (47)
In equilibrium demand of energy should equal supply of energy
AD [(1− α)p+ αpc]ε = Av(p)κv +Ag(p + pc)κg − ξg (48)
In equilibrium demand for green energy (plus certificates) should equal green
supply, and demand for traditional energy should equal traditional supply
αAD [p+ αpc]
ε = Ag(p+ pc)
κg − ξg (49)
(1− α)AD [p+ αpc]ε = Av(p)κv (50)
Table A.1 Four alternative parameters in the demand and supply
functions
Alternative Constant Elasticities Intercept
Av Ag AD κv κg ε ξg
PX − 03− 03− 01 53.75 50 178.1 0.3 0.3 -0.1 131.3
PX − 06− 02− 03 21.9 69 178.1 0.6 0.2 -0.1 131.3
PX − 03− 03− 03 97.8 7.2 178.1 0.1 0.9 -0.1 131.3
PX − 03− 03− 03 53.75 50 324.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 131.3
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